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RECENT DECISIONS
When the present Banking Law was enacted in 1914,5 the provi-
sions of Section 144 were carried over into Section 249, being re-
stricted to savings banks deposits, however. An added sentence in
Section 249 provides: "The making of the deposits in such form
shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evi-
dence in any action or proceeding to which either such savings bank
or the surviving depositor is a party of the intention of both deposi-
tors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such
survivor." The effect of the added provision is to establish a con-
clusive presumption after the death of the depositor of an intent to
make a gift of the funds remaining in the account to the survivor. 6
It does not affect the rebuttable presumption, which exists prior to
the death of the depositor, that a gift of half of the funds deposited
was intended.
The laws relating to tentative trusts 7 have no application in this
case. Here the depositor never declared herself to be a trustee. No
trust was ever created.8
The effect of the statute as presently construed with respect to
funds deposited by an individual in a joint account is: during the life
of the depositor (a) as between the parties a rebuttable presumption
exists that a gift of half of the funds was intended, (b) the bank is
not liable in paying the funds to either person named in the account,
in the absence of notice not to pay in accordance with the terms of
the deposit; after the death of the depositor (a) a conclusive presump-
tion exists that a gift of the entire amount in the account at the time
of death was intended; (b) and the bank incurs no liability in paying
the funds to the survivor. It is important to note that the amount to
which the survivor is presumptively entitled, at the time of deposit,
may exceed the amount in the account at the time a gift is con-
clusively established.
J. F. K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-ExECUTIVE
BUDGET.-In accordance with Article IV-A of the New York Con-
stitution, Section 2, the Governor submitted to the Legislature the
executive budget which contained provisions for lump sum appropri-
ations to the various administrative departments of the State Govern-
ment. The proposed budget bill contained a provision giving the
Governor exclusive power over the segregation within each depart-
ment of the lump sums thus appropriated. The Legislature struck out
'Supra Note 1.
'Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929).
"Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904).
'Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 36 Arm. Rep. 634 (1880).
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from the Governor's bill the provisions for the Governor's control
over segregation and in its place permitted Section 139 of the Finance
Law to take effect, which vested the control over the segregation of
lump sum appropriations in two members of the Legislature and the
Governor. The Governor, upon the return of the bill to him, ap-
proved the lump sum items and, insisting that Section 139 of the
Finance Law was unconstitutional in its application to these items,
he vetoed that portion of the bill which attempted to confer the
power of segregation on members of the Legislature. Upon an agreed
statement of facts, the issue was presented to the Court, the Gover-
nor contending that the "Legislature had no constitutional power to
assign to its chairmen the function of approvers of the segregation
of lump sum appropriations." The respondent (the Attorney-General)
asserts that the Governor had no power to veto the segregation clause
without vetoing the items to which it referred. The Court of Ap-
peals states the question in the case in the following language: "The
first question to be considered is whether the chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee and the chairman of the Assembly Ways and
Means Committee may constitutionally be given the power to approve
segregation of lump sums appropriated by the Legislature to the
State departments." The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division of the Third Department and held invalid Section 139 of the
Finance Law and similar provisions designed to give to two members
of the Legislature and the Governor the power to approve the segre-
gation of lump sum appropriations within departments. People v.
Tremaine, 252 N. Y. - , 168 N. E. - (decided Nov. 19, 1929).
These provisions were attacked on several grounds, all of which
seem to have been upheld by the Court. The prevailing opinion by
Judge Pound stresses the invalidity of the attacked law on the ground
that it violates Section 7 of Article III of the State Constitution
which forbids the giving to members of the Legislature of "any civil
appointments." Resting on a number of decisions of this court, con-
spicuously on Matter of Hulbert,1 the Court held that the attempt
made in Section 139 of the State Finance Law was void since it gave
a civil appointment to two members of the Legislature. Other points,
made the sole ground of the decision by Crane, J., in a concurring
opinion, are not lost sight of by the majority. Most significant is the
statement by Crane, J., that the invalid law has attempted to confer
administrative power on a member of the Legislature. He argues
with great force that even though the Legislature can itemize any
appropriation, nevertheless, "if it makes lump sum appropriations,
1124 Misc. 273, aff'd 213 App. Div. 865, 241 N. Y. 525 (1925). The in-
stances in which members of the Legislature were permitted to hold adminis-
trative offices are dismissed by the Court on the ground that such appointments
were either temporary or ex-offcio (People ex rel. Washington v. Nichols, 52
N. Y. 478 (1873); and on the ground that acquiescence therein does not
amount to a new grant of power (Los Angeles v. Los Angeles C. W. Co., 177
U. S. 558, 579, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736 (1900).
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whatever conditions it may attach to its expenditure, it cannot make
one of those conditions the approval by one of its own members; that
is, to confer upon him the duties of an administrative office."
The development of the Executive Budget is part of a long and
dignified history of the evolution of modern government. The de-
cision strengthens the foundation upon which Budget reform is
based and prevents the attempt by the Legislature to decentralize the
responsibility for public expenditures. To have held otherwise, would
have been an irremediable injury to the efficiency of our administra-
tive department of government.
R.L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER OF
LEGISLATURE TO ENACT MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW. - Plaintiff,
owner of a multiple dwelling, challenges the constitutionality of the
Multiple Dwelling Law on the ground that it violates the Home Rule
provisions of the New York State Constitution insofar as it required
him to light the halls of his multiple dwelling. He contends that the
provisions of said statute relate to the property, affairs of government
of the city of New York and, therefore, should have been passed as
the result of an emergency message of the Governor with the concur-
rent assent of two-thirds of the members of each house of the Legis-
lature and not by a majority vote. The Special Term declared the law
unconstitutional. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, reversed
and complaint dismissed. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467, 167
N. E. 705 (1929).
The Tenement House Law 1 was enacted to remedy the evils ex-
isting in housing conditions, containing provisions in respect to light,
air, fire protection and sanitation. Its validity has been upheld by the
Court of Appeals 2 and by the United States Supreme Court,3 not as
a local city law but as a public health measure under the police power.
The Multiple Dwelling Law 4 is virtually a revision of the Tenement
House Law and was adopted, after a complete survey of the housing
field, to meet modern conditions. The determining factor on this
appeal was the interpretation of the words "property, affairs or gov-
ernment of cities" as used in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitu-
'Laws of 1901, ch. 334, as amended-Consol. Laws, ch. 61.
- Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231
(1904).
-lbid. 203 U. S. 583 (1906).
'Laws of 1929, ch. 713-Consol. Laws, ch. 61-a.
